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The Design of 
Government
In the January 2009 The Pro-fession column (“The Credit Crunch and the Digital Bite,” pp. 116, 114-115), I offered 
two binary measures—one old, one 
new—to attack the monetary disease 
now severely affecting the world. The 
old one would limit artificial entities 
such as commercial enterprises to 
two levels of ownership. The new 
one would limit representations of 
value such as money to two levels of 
abstraction. Both measures are dras-
tic and basic simplifications.
The measures actually being taken 
by governments, or supposedly being 
taken at, for example, last month’s 
G20 Summit, either attack the dis-
ease’s agents through regulation or 
attempt to ameliorate its symptoms 
through fiscal stimuli. The disease 
will probably retreat, but be left alive 
to return later in a stronger form.
Why has the world gone into reces-
sion? The physical part of the world 
hasn’t changed much, at least not at 
anywhere near the rate the financial 
world has changed. Nor has the living 
part of the world, its plants and ani-
mals, its people, and their knowledge 
and skills.
The recession is a failure of gov-
ernment, of society’s nervous system. 
Why did the government of society 
fail us? Because its basic nature hasn’t 
changed while modern society has 
rapidly become more complex. Why 
can’t our governments simplify our 
society? Perhaps because they can’t 
even simplify themselves. Therefore, 
simplifying ownership and value in 
society at large is impossible with our 
present government structure.
TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENT
At least as they exist in developed 
nations, traditional administrations 
provided a simple reform of feudal 
government. It is still a hierarchi-
cal system of monarchs, lords, and 
vassals. Brave, wise men brought in 
democracy to exercise some con-
trol over lords and, in some cases, 
monarchs.
In Australia, the monarch or head 
of government is called the prime min-
ister at the federal level, or the premier 
at the state level. The lords are called 
ministers, and the vassals are amus-
ingly called public servants. There is 
an awkwardness called parliament, 
but the political party system usually 
keeps that under lordly control, and 
its main effect is to keep the media 
supplied with bemusing and some-
times wryly amusing news items.
The scope of government is strictly 
divided into fiefdoms or departments 
nominally distributed by the head of 
government between the ministers. 
These departments are worlds of 
their own in nations with long-term 
stable governments.
Government departments are 
notionally under their minister’s con-
trol. How notional was brought out 
in the BBC radio and television series 
Yes, Minister (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Yes_Minister), with content drawn 
from real life. 
Government departments are very 
much what sociobiologists call super-
organisms. This was brought home to 
me recently when reading a splendid 
book called The Super organism (www.
wwnorton.co.uk/book.html?id=1799) 
and recalling a decade spent in a 
public service city trying to work pro-
ductively with various government 
data processing sections.
Perhaps the best analogy for pres-
ent-day governments is the apiary. 
Each individual hive or department 
is strongly organized to survive as a 
superorganism despite the occasional 
disruptions of the apiarist or minister. 
The superorganism is hierarchically 
structured with a queen or a head at 
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the top and drones or clerks at the 
bottom. The main difference is that 
hives persist through 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, without holidays.
OPERATING SYSTEMS
The problem is that each govern-
ment department takes its fiefdom 
to be its exclusive responsibility. 
Moreover, the fiefdom is introspec-
tive, especially when the department 
is socially isolated from the world at 
large in a city dominated by govern-
ment employees.
How might this introspection be 
broken down? There are plenty of sug-
gestive examples outside government, 
and they have a common theme.
Scientists separate analysis and 
synthesis. Engineers distinguish 
measurement and control in feed-
back loops. Manufacturers balance 
supply and delivery. Our own nervous 
systems use perception to control 
actions.
For the computing profession, 
though, perhaps the best example 
lies in operating systems. They have 
one large essential component that 
accepts and manages incoming data, 
feeding it to appropriate programs, 
and another that manages data from 
the programs it supervises, feeding it 
to the outside world through periph-
eral devices.
Many user programs also have 
major components separately han-
dling data on the way in and out. 
Indeed, many years ago, the US Air 
Force’s data processing people spent 
80 percent of their coding effort and 
space on input data checking (The 
Profession, “The Usefulness of Hind-
sight,” Nov. 2004, pp. 120, 118-119), 
an admirable practice that should be 
much more closely followed nowa-
days (The Profession, “The $100,000 
Keying Error,” Apr. 2008, pp. 108, 106-
107).
These examples share the common 
theme of dividing a process into rela-
tively independent stages. Applying 
the principle to government depart-
ments would have some responsible 
for monitoring and analyzing what 
is happening in and to their country, 
while others would be responsible 
for effecting changes to how things 
happen. The different monitoring and 
analytical departments could focus on 
different areas of societal activity—for 
example, consumption, production, 
and education; while the different 
operative departments could focus 
on different components of society, 
such as organizations, infrastructure, 
and people needing help. 
BIFURCATE GOVERNMENT
Such a bifurcation of government 
departments would break the closed 
loop that currently allows, even 
encourages, government departments 
to hide or disguise their activities, and 
to discount or ignore the activities 
of other departments. Departments 
would have to look outward more 
consistently, and could exhibit fewer 
of a superorganism’s characteristics.
This bifurcation could be done the 
other way around, or in a different 
manner altogether, but the important 
innovation is having a loop-breaking 
bifurcation at all, although I believe 
the approach described here would 
work well.
An analytical department would 
look at the effects of government 
actions in general as they affect its 
own area of social activity, without 
having to devise remedies or allevia-
tions. An operative department would 
look at the effective application of 
government measures generally to 
its own component of society with-
out having to cater to the needs of a 
particular activity area.
An analytical department would 
collect data about its areas of activ-
ity, analyze it, model the activity, and 
predict short- and long-term effects 
under different assumptions. Ana-
lytical ministers would bring such 
predictions together at the cabi-
net and parliamentary level, where 
corrective measures would be con-
sidered and decided.
An operative department would 
apply to its component of society 
staged measures responsive to parlia-
mentary decisions and then monitor 
and enforce adherence to those mea-
sures. Operative ministers would bring 
results of the monitoring together at 
the cabinet and parliamentary level, 
where measures could be modified 
and new decisions influenced.
A major secondary advantage of 
bifurcation is that the skills needed 
for an analytical department’s staff 
would be different from those needed 
for an operative department’s staff. 
Staff training and recruitment would 
become more effective because it 
would be more focused.
Analytical skills are like those 
of the different branches of science 
and mathematics, while operative 
skills are like those of engineering 
and trades. This similarity should 
also make movement between gov-
ernment and private enterprise jobs 
easier, which would have benefits for 
both sides of the exchange.
BIFURCATE POLITICS
Bifurcation of government depart-
ments does not necessarily require 
bifurcation of the elective and higher 
levels of government. These are often 
already bifurcated, but not in the way 
described above.
One common bifurcation splits 
parl iamentary representat ion 
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between two political parties and 
offers a reasonably successful 
means of providing an alternation 
of dominance between two notion-
ally distinct philosophies of social 
values—which seem to become rel-
evant mainly during the final months 
before an election. Much of this pro-
cedure’s danger could be avoided by 
having a system of continuous elec-
tion (The Profession, “Representative 
Democracy and the Profession,” Feb. 
2002, pp. 120, 118-119), but this is 
unlikely to be adopted without major 
preliminary reform.
Another common bifurcation 
divides a parliament into two cham-
bers, usually a lower chamber with 
members notionally representing 
the interests of individual elector-
ates, and an upper chamber with 
groups of members representing 
the interests of districts of elector-
ates, such as states in a federation. 
This approach holds that legisla-
tion should start in the lower house 
but must be endorsed by the upper 
house before taking effect, in prin-
ciple providing for a coalescence of 
local and regional interests. In prac-
tice, especially when proportional 
representation is adopted, this can 
sometimes lead to representatives 
outside the two major political par-
ties holding the balance of power, 
usually seen by the major parties as 
a curse while the public might see it 
as a useful constraint. 
If government departments were 
split between analytical and opera-
tive functioning, then undertaking a 
similar bifurcation of elective respon-
sibilities would be reasonable perhaps 
at the cabinet level or at the chamber 
level. Splitting at the cabinet level 
would mean having two subcabinets, 
one analytical, the other operative. 
This would allow separate consid-
eration of symptoms and remedies. 
The obvious danger here is that this 
would give a schizoid flavor to parlia-
mentary proceedings. Splitting at the 
chamber level has more interesting 
possibilities.
The laws of a parliament usually 
involve two main parts: formal sec-
tions that focus the parliamentary 
debate, and regulations that give the 
details of how to apply the formalities. 
The formal sections spring from the 
cabinet level, while the regulations 
are typically left for the departments 
to add.
Suppose both parts were made 
formal. The sections could then 
define the scope and detail the objec-
tives of the law, and the regulations 
could detail the methods by which 
the objectives are to be achieved. 
The analytical departments would 
support the sections. The opera-
tive departments would apply the 
regulations.
Suppose further that the sections 
and regulations were to move sepa-
rately through the parliamentary 
process. Then the upper chamber 
could introduce and debate in detail 
the sections for approval by the lower 
chamber, and subsequently the lower 
chamber could introduce and debate 
in detail the regulations for approval 
by the upper chamber. Separating 
the sections from the regulations 
would make it easier to debate the 
issues; thus, reaching decisions would 
become simpler and clearer.
If this were done, the process for 
selecting candidates for election could 
be improved. Selection of upper-
chamber candidates might favor an 
analytical background. Selection of 
lower-chamber candidates might 
favor a practical background.
How does all this involve computing professionals? First, all members of a pro-
fessional society have a duty to use 
their skills and experience to benefit 
society at large. Computing profes-
sionals have skills and experience 
relevant to the proper design and 
implementation of systems; systems 
of government are no exception. 
Indeed, they should be seen as sys-
tems with a high priority for reform, 
given their questionable performance 
in recent years. Consider the extraor-
dinary technological developments of 
the past century. It has seemed popu-
larly reasonable from time to time to 
anticipate that technology use would 
banish poverty and unemployment 
and otherwise greatly improve stan-
dards of living everywhere. That this 
hasn’t happened is arguably a gen-
eral failure of governments, which 
were recently expected to be made 
much more effective by their whole-
sale adoption of digital technology.
Second, governments have become 
thoroughly dependent on digital tech-
nology but notoriously incompetent 
in the implementation of large digi-
tal projects. So there is clearly and 
urgently a need for bringing profes-
sional computing into the higher 
levels of government. Candidates for 
election to government should much 
more often be computing profession-
als (but see The Profession, “Should 
Professionals Be Political?” July 2003, 
pp. 100, 98-99).
We face an urgent need for 
improving political effectiveness in 
respect to all parts of the electorate 
and internationally. We will need 
digital technology to survive as a 
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